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JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY:
AN EXAMINATION OF
APPROACHES IN
WISCONSIN AND IN FLORIDA
LEWIS KAPNER*
I. DEFINING CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS
"Joint custody" is a term that is loosely bandied about in
courts around the country. The term has been used inter-
changeably with "separate" custody, in which custody of one
child is granted to one parent and the other child to the other
parent,' and with "split" or "divided" or "alternating" cus-
tody, in which sole custody of the child alternates between
the parents.2 This usage is unfortunate. Separate custody
has nothing to do with joint custody. Divided custody is
similar to many joint custody arrangements, but in some re-
spects is the exact opposite. Joint custody encourages shar-
ing responsibility, while divided custody, where each parent
has sole control for part of the time, encourages splitting,
sometimes competing, responsibilities.
Courts, legislators and social scientists have used at least
eighteen terms to describe alternatives to sole custody: joint
* B.A., University of Florida at Gainesville, 1958; J.D., Stetson Law School,
1962; Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida.
1. See, e.g., Hagge v. Hagge, 234 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1975) (court said that al-
though there is a preference for not dividing brothers and sisters, it was in the best
interests of these children to award the son to the father and the daughter to the
mother); Sandman v. Sandman, 64 A.D.2d 698, 407 N.Y.S.2d 563 (court awarded
youngest child, a son, to the mother, but awarded the oldest child, a daughter, to the
father because her mother had alienated her), appeal denied, 46 N.Y.2d 705, 413
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1978); Kerlee v. Kerlee, 40 Or. App. 367, 595 P.2d 487 (court awarded
younger son to wife and older son to husband), modoedon other grounds, 41 Or. App.
137, 596 P.2d 1331 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 132 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (origi-
nal decree divided the child's time between both parents, but the appellate court
awarded full custody to the mother, saying that "[c]ertainly, no child could grow up
normally when it is hawked about from one parent to the other with the embarrassing
scene of changing homes at least twice a year"). See also Note, Divided Custody After
Their Parents' Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L. 58 (1968).
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legal custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, sepa-
rate custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody,
shared custody, partial custody, custody given to neither
party to the exclusion of the other, temporary custody, shift-
ing custody, concurrent custody,3 dual custody,4 cooperative
parenting5 and shared parenting.6 To this list I would add
"shared parental responsibility," which is the cachet given
the concept in Florida.7 "Joint custody" is the most widely
used term and is the term established in Wisconsin.8 This
article will examine the Wisconsin and Florida approaches
to the issue of joint custody and will show that although
their terminology differs, courts in both states can use their
statutes flexibly to achieve the same result - the best inter-
est of the child.
A. The Wisconsin Approach
Terms such as "joint custody" should be specifically and
carefully defined either by statute or by case law but, unfor-
tunately, the Wisconsin statute9 falls a little short in this re-
spect. The current statute, section 767.24,10 which became a
part of the Family Code1 in 1977, provides that:
3. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 360 n.79 (1979) (identifying the first
fifteen terms).
4. See, e.g., Patrick v. Patrick, 17 Wis. 2d 434, 436-37, 117 N.W.2d 256, 258
(1962) (wife's attorney argued that arrangement allowing the father a maximum of 84
days visitation, 60 of them to be in Florida, was dual custody, but the court did not
agree).
5. Address by Hugh McIsaacs, Florida Supreme Court Commission on Matrimo-
nial Law (Jan. 20, 1983).
6. See, e.g., Banel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce, 49 AM. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320 (1979).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983). See also Costa v. Costa,
429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), where the court said:
The declaration of such public policy and the use of the term "responsibility"
as opposed to "custody" is aspirational. It would be society's greatest reward
- tangibly and otherwise - were the future adult inhabitants of this state able
to look back to the 1980's and reflect how their predecessors finally came to
recognize the priority to be given the well being of children.
8. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(l)(b) (1981-1982). Prior to 1977, Wisconsin trial courts
were statutorily required to grant custody to one parent only. See Wis. STAT.
§ 247.24 (1975).
9. Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (1981-1982).
10. Id
11. Wis. STAT. chs. 765-68 (1981-1982).
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The court may give the care and custody of such children
to the parties jointly if the parties so agree and if the court
finds that a joint custody arrangement would be in the best
interest of the child or children. Joint custody under this
paragraph means that both parents have equal rights and
responsibilities to the minor child and neither party's rights
are superior. 12
The Wisconsin Legislature emphasized its commitment to
the laudable goals of joint custody by enunciating its legisla-
tive purpose as follows: "It is the intent of the legislature to
recognize children's needs for close contact with both par-
ents, to encourage joint parental responsibility for the wel-
fare of minor children and to promote expanded
visitation."' 13 While the legislature's purpose-to recognize
children's need for close contact with both parents, to en-
courage joint parental responsibility and to promote ex-
panded visitation-is clear enough, Wisconsin's specific
definition of joint custody fails to distinguish between joint
legal custody and joint physical custody. Comparing this
legislative intent with the specific definition in the statute, it
appears that the legislature is combining the two concepts.
However, it is difficult to envision a situation where both
parents enjoy equal rights and responsibilities to the minor
child without the sharing of physical custody as well and,
more specifically, the equal sharing of that custody. The
main problem with Wisconsin's statutory definition is that
such a custody arrangement is virtually impossible to attain
in most divorce situations.
The reason this definition is not satisfactory is that there
are many "sharing" arrangements which are neither "sole
custody" nor "equal joint custody" but which will accom-
plish the legislative intent of encouraging close contact with
both parents, joint parental responsibility and expanded visi-
tation. In short, despite the apparently clear language of sec-
tion 767.24, Wisconsin still needs a definition of the kind of
"joint" custody envisioned in the legislative intent, as op-
posed to the statute's specific delineation of "joint custody."
12. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(1)(b) (1981-1982).
13. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, § 1(2), 1977 Wis. Laws 560, 561.
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B. The Florida Approach
By contrast, Florida's new Shared Parental Responsibil-
ity Act 14 more explicitly expresses Florida's requirements:
"Shared parental responsibility" means that both parents
retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect
to their child and requires both parents to confer so that
major decisions affecting the welfare of the child will be
determined jointly. In ordering shared parental responsi-
bility, the court may. . grant to one party the ultimate
responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or
may divide those aspects between the parties based on the
best interests of the child.15
It is the public policy of the state to assure each minor child
frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of
childrearing. 6
Thus, the legislative goals in both states are the same. The
statutes are similar also, but Wisconsin's is too limited; how-
ever, if Wisconsin courts ultimately interpret the law to en-
courage trial courts to exercise flexibility in their joint
custody awards, Wisconsin and Florida may end up taking
the same approach to this very sensitive issue. They might
do this by stressing the legislative purpose rather than the
specific definition of "joint custody."' 17
C. Case Law
So far Wisconsin appellate courts have not specifically
addressed the issue of defining joint custody either before or
14. Shared Parental Responsibility Act, ch. 82-96, 1982 Fla. Laws 233 (codified at
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West Supp. 1983)).
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
16. Id § 61.13(2)(b)(1).
17. In fact, one Wisconsin attorney who has practiced extensively at the Milwau-
kee County Children's Court believes that there does not appear to be any real sub-
stantive difference between the two state statutes:
The Wisconsin statute, while vaguely written, certainly can accommodate the
Florida situation and any others that are presented by the facts of the specific
case. I am not sure, given the legislative history of the Wisconsin law, that
judges need the specific statutory direction provided in the Florida statute.
Letter from Paula K. Lorant to the Marquette Law Review (Mar. 14, 1983).
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after passage of the Divorce Reform Act.' In 1963 the
supreme court disapproved of a divided responsibility order
which authorized a father to make decisions relating to sum-
mer camp while the mother had sole custody of the child.' 9
The opinion indicated disapproval of the concept of a parent
without physical custody making decisions regarding the
welfare of the child. On the other hand, in Patrick v. Pat-
rick20 the court expressed approval of the concept of ex-
panded visitation, which the wife called "dual custody." In
that case the court discussed the limited authority a visiting
parent has to care for the child's immediate and emergency
needs.2' In the recent case of Sandy v. Sandy2 the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals upheld a trial judge's order which al-
ternated custody of the children and of the home on a
bimonthly basis. The court extensively discussed the author-
ity of the family court commissioner and the trial judge to
evict a spouse from the homestead when there is no actual or
threatened physical violence, but ignored the concept of
joint or divided custody. It is tempting to try to definitively
assess Wisconsin's attitude toward joint custody by analyz-
ing the underlying philosophy of these few cases, but the
scarcity of comment and the dynamic nature of family law
make such an effort futile.
Decisions in Florida courts prior to the enactment of the
new statute were equally ambiguous. Although appellate
decisions affirmed most of the numerous awards of joint or
divided custody decrees entered by trial judges, the follow-
ing statement by the court of appeal is not unusual:
"[O]bviously they both cannot have the custody because
they stand divorced from each other; and any attempt to di-
vide permanent custody of minor children is emphatically
frowned upon by the Courts."' '
18. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560.
19. Kritzik v. Kritzik, 21 Wis. 2d 442, 450, 124 N.W.2d 581, 586 (1963) (father
claimed right to determine which camp his child would attend since he was to pay the
cost, but court said "it is the type of decision that must be left to the person having
custody of the children").
20. 17 Wis. 2d 434, 117 N.W.2d 256 (1962).
21. Id at 437, 117 N.W.2d at 258.
22. 106 Wis. 2d 230, 316 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1982).
23. Julian v. Julian, 188 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (citations
omitted).
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In an earlier case, Phillips v. Philips,24 the Florida
Supreme Court reversed an order which gave custody of an
infant to the mother with directions that the child should be
allowed to visit the father for the first week of each month.
The court interpreted this to be a "divided custody" order
and reversed, saying:
There can be no doubt that experience shows that it is det-
rimental to the best interests of a young child to have [his/
her] custody and control shifted often from one household
to another and to be changed often from the discipline and
teachings which are attempted to be imparted by one cus-
todian to that other discipline and teachings sought to be
imparted by another custodian. 5
Five months later in Watson v. Watson,26 however, the same
court approved a decree mandating placement of the child
with one parent for six months and then with the other for
six months without even referring to Phill#7s.27
The one appellate decision in Florida interpreting the
new Act has warmly embraced its philosophy, particularly
with respect to the law's emphasis on parental responsibility
rather than control. In that case, Costa v. Costa,28 the trial
court modified a provision entered prior to passage of the
Act restricting the wife's right to move the children, ages
seven and nine, from South Florida. The wife was granted
custody and the husband was given "generous" and specific
visitation. Shortly after the divorce both parties remarried
and, six months after the final judgment, the wife sought
permission to move with the children to Philadelphia on the
ground that her new husband could earn $4,000 more per
year there. The trial court, granted her request but the ap-
pellate court, relying on the Shared Parental Responsibility
Act, reversed.29 Speaking for the majority, Judge Glickstein
observed:
24. 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (1943).
25. Id at _, 13 So. 2d at 923.
26. 153 Fla. 668, 15 So. 2d 446 (1943).
27. Id at _ 15 So. 2d at 447.
28. 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
29. See also Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (pre-
Act case in which the court would allow a custodial mother to move from Florida to
Alaska with the children only upon a showing of substantial or material change of
circumstances even though the divorce decree contained no residence restriction).
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Both of these parents have a fundamental, continual and
permanent obligation to these children that can only be
satisfied by the love and attention the close proximity of
the two of them can provide at this time. The court can
best serve the children's interest by making it possible that
this occurs.3°
The court left little doubt that it would strongly enforce the
shared responsibility concept:
[T]o recognize any such opinion which disregards close,
continuing contact of minor children with both parents af-
ter dissolution would disregard the public policy now ex-
pressly recognized by the legislature of this state; namely,
"to assure each minor child frequent and continuing con-
tact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved their marriage. '31
II. HISTORY OF PARENTAL PREFERENCE
In order to fully understand the concept of joint custody,
it is necessary to consider the history of parental preference
rules and of the current gender neutral view of parental cus-
tody. At common law, husband and wife were one and the
husband, being the one, received custody of the children in
the event the marriage broke up.32 This preference for the
father continued in the United States into the twentieth cen-
tury and was perhaps best expressed by Justice Brewer of the
Kansas Supreme Court in 1881:
The father is the natural guardian and isprimafacie enti-
tled to the custody of his minor child. This right springs
from two sources: one is, that [it is] he who brings a child,
...into life . . .; the other reason is, that it is a law of
nature that the affection which springs from such a relation
30. Costa, 429 So. 2d at 1251. Even Judge Anstead's dissent agreed with the
philosophy of the Act: "I find myself in agreement with virtually everything said in
the majority opinion, and most especially with the concerns expressed for the chil-
dren." Id at 1253.
31. Id at 1252-53 (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., Wellesley v. Beauford, 2 Russ. 1, 21 (Eng. Rep. 1827); People ex rel.
Pruyne v. Walts, 122 N.Y. 238, 25 N.E. 266 (1890). Cf. Welch v. Welch, 33 Wis. 534
(1873) (court transferred custody of young boy to father despite the fact that the fa-
ther had deserted the mother and child and had not supported them; the father alleg-
edly was a man of means who kept a gambling house in Stevens Point). See also 1 A.
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS, §§ 14-31
(1978); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 28 (1971).
19831
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as that is stronger and more potent than any which springs
from any other human relation.33
In the case of In re Stillman Goodenough34 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized this rule as being grounded in the
common law.
3 5
Forty years later Wisconsin abolished the father prefer-
ence rule in Jenkins v. Jenkins.36 In that case, which reversed
a trial court award of the two eldest sons to the father, the
court rhapsodized on mother love in much the same lan-
guage courts had previously bestowed on fathers:
For a boy of such tender years nothing can be an adequate
substitute for mother love - for that constant ministration
required during the period of nurture that only a mother
can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in de-
sire; in her alone is service expressed in terms of love. She
alone has the patience and sympathy required to mold and
soothe the infant mind in its adjustment to its environment.
The difference between fatherhood and motherhood in this
respect is fundamental and the laws should recognize it un-
less offset by undesirable traits in the mother.37
Wisconsin courts have not been alone in their febrile ex-
pressions of mother love. It is hard to top Justice Fulbright
of the Missouri Supreme Court when he wrote, in 1938:
"There is but a twilight zone between a mother's love and
the atmosphere of heaven, '38 but Justice Terrell of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court tried in 1941:
[S]he is morally, spiritually, and biologically best suited to
care for it [the child] during infancy and adolescence. She
is more sensitive to influences that are derogatory to its
health and character and has been known to pursue it to
the gutter and retrieve it after the father had abandoned it.
In deeds springing from innate nobleness, the mother is the
33. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 652 (1881).
34. 19 Wis. 291 (1865).
35. Id. at 296 (court recognized general rule that a father has a right to his child,
but in this case the father had been in prison, the mother was in the poorhouse and
the daughter was an indentured servant who was deemed better off where she was).
36. 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921) (court awarded permanent custody of
three sons to mother although both parents were of roughly equal means and the two
oldest boys had been in the temporary custody of the father).
37. Id at 595, 181 N.W. at 827.
38. Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W. 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
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peer of the father and when it comes to instinctive and in-
tuitional powers she is much his superior.
In civilized society, no calling rises above that of mother-
hood and in the care of minor children, she makes her most
abiding impression. In this, the father is by nature a poor
second ....
If ever he had the will to wield the rod of authority over his
home, the refinements of civilization have drawn his fangs.
He is now the world's champion heeler, his wife precedes
him through the door and down the aisle; she is waited on
before he is and is everywhere preferred to him. He is sec-
ond at every social function and when he enters his curti-
lage, the very atmosphere reminds him that he is within the
confines of an absolute matriarchy. If it is a benevolent
one, he likes it; otherwise he spends his evenings at the
club. 3
9
Although judges such as these heaped praises upon the
nation's mothers, this praise frequently was reserved only for
those who "behaved themselves," that is, ran the household,
changed the diapers and kept the children quiet. As Justice
Terrell wrote in 1943: "If she goes and returns as a wage
earner like the father, she has no more part in [child care]
than he and it necessarily follows that all things else being
equal, she has no better claim when the matter of custody is
at issue." 4 And in the recent Pulitzer case4' the trial judge
concluded that even though neither parent was a candidate
for parent of the year, it was the mother and not the father
who "abandoned the primary care-taker role to nannies and
the father. 42
Once Wisconsin abolished the father preference rule in
favor of gender neutrality,43 the courts began to prefer
mothers. 44 Consequently, in 1971 the legislature passed a
39. Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, - I So. 2d 480, 481-82 (1941).
40. Watson v. Watson, 153 Fla. 668, _ 15 So. 2d 446, 447 (1943).
41. Pulitzer v. Pulitzer, No. 81-5263 (Cir. Ct. West Palm Beach, Fla. 1982).
42. Id See also J. Sanford, Contested Custody and the Judicial Decision Making
Process (1977) (doctoral dissertation available at Florida State University library)
(observing that Florida circuit judges frequently concluded that mothers, but not fa-
thers, who did not seek custody "abandoned" their children).
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964) (where
the court said it was an abuse of discretion not to award custody of a five-year-old girl
1983]
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law to explicitly require equality of treatment.45  But
Scolman v. Scolman,46 the first appellate case interpreting
this statute, created confusion. In reversing a judgment
awarding custody to the mother the court said:
We conclude that sec. 247.24(3), Stats., does not strike
down the holdings of this court indicating that, other things
being equal, there is usually a preference for the mother.
The trial court may properly find that young children are
better off with their mother. The statute merely decrees
what the law in Wisconsin is already, that the trial court's
decision cannot solely be based on the sex of the parent.47
As pointed out by Justice Heffernan in his concurring opin-
ion, the majority clearly misinterpreted the existing strong
mother preference rule. 8
Wisconsin courts are not alone in resisting legislative sev-
erence of the umbilical cord. In 1971 the Florida Legislature
enacted a sweeping reform of the state's divorce laws,49 in-
cluding provisions directing equal treatment of the sexes.50
With respect to custody, the legislature required that "[u]pon
considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall
be given the same consideration as the mother in determin-
ing custody."51  But the Florida Supreme Court soon an-
nounced that other factors being equal, the mother would
to the mother, who had been adjudged a fit parent). See also Peterson v. Peterson, 13
Wis. 2d 26, 108 N.W.2d 126 (1961); Acheson v. Acheson, 235 Wis. 610, 294 N.W. 6
(1940).
45. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, ch. 157, § 2, 1971 Wis. Laws 415, 416 (currently codified
at Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (1981-1982) ("In making a custody determination, the court
shall consider all facts in the best interest of the child and shall not prefer one poten-
tial custodian over the other on the basis of the sex of the custodian."). See also
Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1972) (advo-
cating equal footing for each parent with past presumptions replaced by greater reli-
ance on social scientists and expert testimony of psychologists and psychiatrists).
46. 66 Wis. 2d 761, 226 N.W.2d 388 (1975).
47. Id at 766, 226 N.W.2d at 390 (emphasis added).
48. Id at 768-72, 226 N.W.2d at 392-94 (Heffernan, J., concurring).
49. Act of June 22, 1971, ch. 71-241, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319.
50. Eg., id § 10, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, 1323 (currently codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1983) (alimony may be granted to either party)); Act of
June 22, 1971, ch. 71-241, § 15, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, 1325 (currently codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.13(1) (West Supp. 1983) (either spouse may be required to pay child
support)).
51. Act of June 22, 1971, ch. 71-241, § 15, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, 1325 (currently
codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1983)).
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still receive prime consideration in custody disputes when
the children were of tender years. 2
Despite pronouncements such as these, the nation's
courts began to establish a more truly neutral view of the
sexes in the 1970's. In a line of cases beginning with Reed v.
Reed 3 the United States Supreme Court developed the doc-
trine that laws classifying individuals on the basis of sex
must be carefully scrutinized and be substantially related to
an important governmental purpose if they are to be up-
held. 4 This developing judicial view toward equality of
treatment of the sexes was also reflected in the changing atti-
tudes of state trial judges.55
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN AWARDING JOINT CUSTODY
The ultimate test for whether joint custody or shared pa-
rental responsibility should be attempted is whether the ar-
rangement would be in the best interest of the child. 6 This
52. See, e.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975) (custody of three-year-
old child given to adulterous mother); Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975)
(two-and-one-half year old twin girls awarded to father, although both parents fit).
In 1982 the Florida Legislature finally announced that it meant what it said in
1971 by adding the phrase "without regard to the age of the child" to section
61.13(2)(b). Shared Parental Responsibility Act, ch. 82-96, 1982 Fla. Laws 233.
Even before passage of this Act, a shift toward gender neutrality was occurring.
See Wiggins v. Wiggins, 411 So. 2d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),petition for reviewl de-
nied, 418 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1982) (court held that it was an abuse of discretion to
award custody of a six-year old child to the mother solely on the basis of the age of
the child). See also infra note 55.
53. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54. Id at 75-76. See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama law which
permitted wives but not husbands to receive alimony held violative of the equal pro-
tection clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(equal protection clause violated by law prohibiting beer sales to males under 21 and
females under 18); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (law requiring fe-
male members of the armed forces to establish that husbands were actually dependent
before being entitled to benefits violated equal protection).
55. See Kapner & Frumkes, The Trial of a Custody Conflict, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1978,
at 174, 176-77; J. Sanford, supra note 42, at - The Florida Bar Journal article de-
scribes surveys of Florida judges taken in 1977 which revealed that 82% would favor
the mother where both parents were fit, even (impliedly) where the father was more
fit. By contrast, in a 1982 survey ofjudges attending the Family Court Seminar at the
National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, two-thirds favored mothers in custody
cases involving children of tender years, while one-third favored mothers in all cases.
Twenty percent defined "tender years" as under two years of age; 55% as zero to six
years; 20% as zero to 12 years; and 5% as zero to 16 years of age.
56. See generally Comment, The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin
Custody Cases, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 343 (1980) and the cases discussed therein.
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test, although generally attributed to Justice Cardozo in the
case of Finlay v. Finlay,5 7 was mentioned in Wisconsin as
early as 1865 in the case of In re Stillman Goodenough :58
"[I]f [the child] was of such tender years that he could not
form a proper judgment, the court would exercise its judg-
ment for his benefit, and do what it thought most for his
interest and welfare." 59 In 1873 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed this laudatory goal more explicitly, saying
that: "The welfare of the children, and how their interests
will be best subserved are the matters of primary considera-
tion with the court. 6 °
A. Benefits
Potentially, many benefits can accrue to a child in a joint
custody arrangement, but because all benefits will be real-
ized only in the ideal case, it is not necessary to predict at-
tainment of every benefit before ordering joint custody. If,
however, it is clear that few benefits will be realized, the
risks involved in such an arrangement might dictate that sole
and not joint custody is preferable.
Wisconsin law requires that courts "recognize children's
need for close contact with both parents, . . . encourage
joint parental responsibility. . . and expanded visitation."'6 1
This law dictates, then, that some sort of "joint" custody ar-
rangement be preferred over one calling for custody to the
mother or the father, even though the decree might be called
"sole" custody. Consequently, it should be the burden of the
proponent of a true sole custody award to demonstrate that
the risks outweigh the benefits rather than the other way
around.
Benefits to the child include the greater stability of pa-
rental relationships and the continuation of full parental re-
sponsibility. This is consistent with a common clause in
separation agreements which provides that: "The parties
shall use all reasonable efforts to maintain free access and to
57. 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
58. 19 Wis. 291 (1865).
59. Id at 296.
60. Welch v. Welch, 33 Wis. 534, 542 (1873). The best interest of the child test
was adopted by Florida in 1882. McGill v. McGill, 19 Fla. 341, 349 (1882).
61. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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create a feeling of affection between themselves and the mi-
nor child. Neither should do anything to hamper the natural
development of the child's love and respect for the other
party." Thus, joint custody attempts to continue, as much as
possible, the custodial arrangement that most clearly ap-
proximates that of the marital home to which the child is
accustomed. Even if the arrangement must later be modi-
fied, at least it would have provided a smoother transition
than the traditional severence process.
Although it is often said that responsibility decisions
should be based on the best interest of the child and not on
the desires of the parents, the reality is that most responsibil-
ity problems involve difficulties with parents, not children.
Practically speaking, arrangements which establish only an
idealized concept of the "best interest of the child" but ig-
nore the needs and wishes of parents are the kind which are
continuously litigated and, consequently, work against the
best interest of the child. If parents cooperate with each
other because their wishes are fulfilled, children will enjoy
more stability than if the custody order, while theoretically
perfect, in practice exacerbates hostility between the parents.
Under joint custody the nonresidential parent can con-
tinue to enjoy full parental rights and responsibilities,
thereby diminishing the terrible sense of loss and the feeling
of being extraneous, expendable or outcast.62 Although the
noncustodian is usually the father, it is generally the mother,
when cast in that role, who receives the greatest psychologi-
cal benefit of joint custody because of the stigma often
placed upon a mother who does not have custody of the
child.63 The primary residential parent also gets some relief
from the stresses of fulltime parenting which might other-
wise engender resentment toward the child.
If negative feelings are instilled in a parent, he or she is
less likely to continue a proper parental role and the child
will be the ultimate loser. Also, a nonresidential parent who
continues to enjoy full rights and responsibilities will have
greater motivation to contribute his or her fair share of sup-
62. See generally M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1978).
63. See Brooks, Mothers Defending Rights of Custody, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1983,
at 48, col. 5.
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port-a consideration of great importance in light of the dis-
mal state of financial support by noncustodians in this
country.64
Joint custody is more likely to offer the child a greater
opportunity to be with and to continue a close relationship
with each parent. Even where one parent has a substantially
greater physical involvement, the child is more likely to view
each parent as a "full" parent, rather than one parent as a
disciplinarian and the other as a Disney World companion.
As the court in Gerscovich v. Gerscovich65 put it:
There can be no question that a child benefits from the
influence of both a father and a mother in making the va-
ried and, at times, stressful adjustments imposed by adoles-
cence and its transformation to adulthood. Where
circumstances warrant, as here, the best interest of minor
children may well be served by alternating [physical] cus-
tody between parents.66
B. Risks
Most of the risks occur when joint custody is awarded
automatically or to avoid a difficult decision or to avoid be-
ing thought of as "old fashioned." The Wisconsin Legisla-
ture, along with legislatures across the country, 67 addressed
the concept of joint custody, not because courts were making
such awards in inappropriate cases, but because some courts
refused to do so even when clearly warranted. 68 If courts
now order joint custody without weighing the potential risks
against the benefits, parent-child relationships will not be
served.
Joint custody should be ordered in every case where it is
not detrimental, but courts should be alert to the risks. For
64. See Divorce 4merican Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42, 47; Brooks,
Child Support: .4 Growing Problem of Nonpayment, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1982, at
B 10, col. 2 (stating that today a divorced woman has only a 10% chance of being paid
on time and in full).
65. 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
66. Id at 1153 (emphasis added).
67. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(l)(b) (1981-1982). As of September 1982, 27 states have
adopted statutes allowing joint custody in some cases. Freed & Foster, Family Law in
the F#iy States.: An Overview as of September 1982, 8 FAM. L. REP. 4065 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Ponder v. Rice, 479 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (divided cus-
tody should be ordered only when there is no reasonable alternative); Rickard v.
Rickard, 7 Wash. App. 907, 503 P.2d 763 (1972) (divided custody should be avoided).
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example, if factors such as parental maturity or fitness are
negative, joint custody, because of its greater reliance on co-
operation and flexibility, could result in manipulation and
arguments by both the child and the parents.69 A child who
is shuttled back and forth between hostile parents of sharply
different lifestyles and disciplinary attitudes can only experi-
ence more difficult adjustment problems than otherwise.
Some critics contend that this results in "lack of stability in
the home environment" and can cause children to "become
prey to severe and crippling loyalty conflicts." 70
Despite these risks, everything should be done to foster
the continuation of the full parent-child relationship with
each parent by granting joint custody because if it works, it
will result in the child continuing to enjoy the benefits of
both parent% Sole custody implies an acknowledgment that
the relationship with one parent will, and should, be limited.
C Factors
It is impossible to make a definitive list of all factors
which the court should consider in making a decision on
joint custody, depending as it does on the interrelationship
of many diverse considerations. It is also difficult to rank the
69. See, e.g., Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019,407 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1978). In Braiman the court stated:
It is understandable, therefore, that joint custody is encouraged primarily as
a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in ma-
ture civilized fashion. . . . As a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon
already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious
vices and wrongs, joint custody can only enhance familial chaos.
More than four years since their separation, the parents are evidently still
unable to manage their common problems with their children, let alone trust
each other. Instead, they continue to find fault and accuse. They have failed
to work out between themselves even a limited visitation with the children. To
expect them to exercise the responsibility entailed in sharing their children's
physical custody at this time seems beyond rational hope. It would, moreover,
take more than reasonable self-restraint to shield the children, as they go from
house to house, from the ill feelings, hatred, and disrespect each parent
harbors towards the other.
Id at 589-90, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
70. In re Marriage of Burham, 383 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1979) (court reversed
joint custody order because atmosphere between parties had the flavor of an "armed
camp").
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factors in order of importance, since in some circumstances
one usually "unimportant" factor might outweigh the others.
If any factor can be considered the sine qua non of joint
custody, it would be that both parents should be fit.7 1 Just as
an unfit parent should not be given sole responsibility, he or
she should not be given the right to share equally in child
rearing responsibilities. 72 Preferably the parties should be
comparable in their fitness, 73 and if neither party is fit, joint
custody should not be ordered for that reason alone.74
What Wisconsin trial judges should do when neither
party is fit in light of a legislative mandate to encourage joint
parental responsibility, close contact and expanded visitation
is not clear. The Group for Advancement of Psychiatry
points out that: "The very possessive parent, the parent who
is going to discourage the child from visitation, is likely to
deprive the child of important input from the estranged
spouse when given sole custody. ' 75  Thus, simply because
conditions for joint custody are not ideal, sole custody
should not necessarily be ordered, since this might result in a
worse situation. If parents are not willing to cooperate
under joint custody, they may be equally unwilling to coop-
erate under sole custody. Nevertheless, the court must order
71. See Farwell v. FarwelL 33 Wis. 2d 324, 147 N.W.2d 289 (1967) (words "fit"
and "proper" on issue of custody in divorce cases are usually interpreted as meaning
moral fitness); Larson v. Larson, 30 Wis. 2d 291, 140 N.W.2d 230 (1966) (evidence of
past conduct, prior physical and emotional conditions and other previous circum-
stances is relevant and material as a reasonable guide in considering question of
fitness). But see Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
("There is a clear distinction between fitness of parents and the best interests of the
child.").
72. But see Lindgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(where court approved a custody arrangement whereby the young twins were to be
with the father four days and the mother three days a week even though the mother
had, prior to the custody proceeding, carried on a liaison with a married man and
lived in a home rented by him).
73. See, e.g., Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (alternating custody ordered when both parents found fit).
74. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 401 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (revers-
ing the trial court's award of joint custody based on a finding that "both parents were
found to be, euphemistically, less than ideal"; court found that such a rationale
"hardly justifies plaguing the child with both their houses" and remanded the case for
a determination of custody in accordance with the child's best interests).
75. Gardner, Family Evaluations in Child Custody Litigation, CREATIVE THERA-
PEUTICS, 1980, at -
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one or the other, and the chief consideration is which ar-
rangement offers the best opportunity to endow the child
with the full benefit of both parents, keeping in mind Wis-
consin's public policy mandating "close contact with both
parents,. . . joint parental responsibility. . . and expanded
visitation. ' 76  These are not empty words. They are the
heart of Wisconsin's approach to parent-child relationships
following divorce.
Agreement of the parents is another strong factor in
awarding joint custody.77 Even the parties' failure to agree
76. Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, § 1(2), 1977 Wis. Laws 560, 561.
77. See, e.g., Lindgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(alternating custody order agreed to by parties termed "unusual" but upheld by
court).
This author knows of no appellate decision reversing a joint custody order where
the parents have agreed to it, nor does he know of any appellate court decision deal-
ing with a trial court's refusal to grant joint custody in the face of a positive agree-
ment. On the other hand, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West Supp. 1983) provides that
the court may consider the agreement of the parties, but Florida courts have never
been bound by an agreement of the parties as to custody or child support.
Wis. STAT. § 767.24(b) (1981-1982) requires joint custody when the parties have
made such an agreement unless otherwise dictated by the best interest of the child.
One Wisconsin practitioner predicts possible problems arising from this issue of con-
sent or agreement of the parties:
[A]lthough the Wisconsin statute requires a joint custody arrangement to be in
the best interest of the child, there is no independent evaluation of what those
best interests are. If the parties agree and there are no apparent problems with
either party's "fitness," joint custody will be granted. The judge does not have
the benefit of either a guardian ad litem's recommendation or a social worker's
custody evaluation, and must take the word of the parents. I suppose the as-
sumption is made that parents will always act in the best interest of their chil-
dren and that the involvement of both parents in custody decisions after a
divorce is the "best" for the children. I do not know that this assumption is
valid in every application for joint custody. Neither the Florida nor the Wis-
consin statutes address this point. [But see Koslowsky v. Koslowsky, 41 Wis.
2d 275, 163 N.W.2d 632 (1969) (stipulation of parties not determinative in cus-
tody matters; requirement that court decide on the basis of best interest of the
child transcended any agreement of the parties)]. [A]s to the issue of consent,
the Wisconsin statutes are somewhat contradictory. Wis. STAT. § 767.23(l)(a)
(1981-1982) allows the Family Court Commissioner to make a temporary
award ofjoint custody with or without the parties' consent. By contrast, Wis.
STAT. § 767.24(l)(b) (1981-1982) requires the parties' consent before the trial
judge can make a permanent joint custody order. I am not sure if this was an
oversight in drafting or a way of allowing the parties to see if joint custody
works before a final order is rendered. I think it can be interpreted either way,
and some family court commissioners are, in fact, ordering joint custody with-
out both parties' consent.
Letter from Paula K. Lorant to the Marquette Law Review (Mar. 14, 1983).
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to joint custody should not necessarily require sole custody.78
If the parties are able to cooperate on child rearing, that
should override their failure to reach a comprehensive sepa-
ration agreement or their respective desires for sole
responsibility.
Other considerations include the preference of the
child,79 the attitude of the child toward the nonresidential
parent80 and the ability and willingness of the parents to co-
operate with each other for the best interest of the child" -
78. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13
(1976). In that case the court ordered joint custody even though the parents not only
disagreed as to joint custody but were antagonistic toward each other. The court
reasoned that the parents had reached agreements in the past which were fair and
would probably be able to do so in the future. Cf. Beck v. Beck, 173 N.J. Super. 33,
413 A.2d 350 (1980) (the court reversed a joint custody order because it was against
the wishes of both the children and the parents).
79. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(2)(am) (1981-1982). A child's preference, assuming suffi-
cient intelligence, understanding and experience, is entitled to great weight, but is not
controlling. See Haugen v. Haugen, 82 Wis. 2d 411, 262 N.W.2d 769 (1978). "[T]he
personal preference of a child is not a controlling consideration on the issue of cus-
tody unless the child gives substantial reasons why it would be against his or her best
interests to award custody contrary to such expressed preference ...." Id at 417,
262 N.W.2d at 772. "[W]hen a trial court confers with the minor children in cham-
bers, a record of the event should be made as a matter of course." Id Seelandt v.
Seelandt, 24 Wis. 2d 73, 128 N.W.2d 66 (1964) (14-year-old girl preferred to live with
grandparents and was so placed); Graichen v. Graichen, 20 Wis. 2d 200, 121 N.W.2d
737 (1963) (girl, almost 14, preferred to live with father; preference given weight when
it was backed up by statements of other witnesses); Edwards v. Edwards, 270 Wis. 48,
70 N.W.2d 22 (1955) (1 1-year-old boy "sick at heart" when custody changed from
foster parents to father); Jones v. State ex rel. Falligant, 211 Wis. 9, 247 N.W. 445
(1933) (14-year-old girl allowed to decide she would remain with grandparents).
See also Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(upheld a rotating custody order partly because the children preferred it); Garvey v.
Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (preference of seven-year-old girl
held not to be sufficient in the face of a strong recommendation by a psychologist
against joint custody); Gall v. Gall, 336 So. 2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (specific
residential decision should not be left to the "unbridled discretion" of a 14-year-old
girl). See generally Siegel & Hurley, The Role of Child's Preference in Custody Pro-
ceedings, 2 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1977).
80. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So. 2d 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (reversing
split custody order wherein the child would be with the father one weekend a month,
one week in the summer and one week during the school year on the ground that the
father upset the child; court-ordered psychologist recommended a more gradual re-
sumption of the father-child relationship). Just as the forcing of even limited visita-
tion might exacerbate a bad parent-child relationship, imposing joint custody in such
circumstances could be even worse.
81. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 409 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
("[W]here, as here, both parents are mature and responsible individuals, there is a
great deal to be said for a custody arrangement which preserves the parental role of
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a factor which behooves the court to examine the maturity
and compatibility of child rearing views of the parties.8 2 The
court should also look into the particular psychological and
emotional needs of the child,83 the degree to which split resi-
dential care would disrupt the child's normal school sched-
ule84 and the age and maturity of the child.
both parties and encourages shared responsibility and joint decision-making for the
benefit of the child.").
This does not mean that parents must love each other or that they must get along
well in all respects, only that they can put their differences aside when it comes to the
welfare and rearing of the child and that they recognize the importance of both par-
ents to the process. All other factors are related to this factor. If, despite everything
else, the parties still are unable to cooperate with each other, joint custody win be a
concept in name only and the reality will be either a sole custody type arrangement or
a never ending source of family stress. See, e.g., Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d
1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing joint custody award because parents were
mutually antagonistic and it might be perceived by, and thus influence, the children);
Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978) (re-
versing joint custody order because of mutual hostility of parents). But see, e.g., Levy
v. Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976) (joint custody
awarded because it would tend to ameliorate the ill will between the parents and
psychologically uplift each parent, all of which would be communicated to the child
in the way of mutual love, attention and training).
82. See, e.g., Rickard v. Rickard, 7 Wash. App. 907, 503 P.2d 763 (1972) (revers-
ing an alternating custody award because, among other things, there were widely di-
vergent viewpoints of the parents on child rearing which would leave the children in a
state of confusion and also the lack of any consistent parental counsel, direction and
control).
83. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So. 2d 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (reversing
split custody order because the psychologist said this arrangement threatened the
child's great need for a stable environment). In these situations, expert testimony is
helpful and when such testimony clearly recommends against joint custody, courts
have properly paid heed to it. See, e.g., Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (reversing a divided custody order in the face of a seven-year-old girl's
preference because the "only evidence" was the psychologist's strong recommenda-
tion against joint custody).
84. See, e.g., Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(children kept in same home while parents rotated until father remarried and plan
modified to allow father to keep children in his new home which was only three miles
from marital home).
85. See, e.g., Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(reversing joint custody award and requiring sole custody to the mother because of
the young ages of the children). This preference for the mother when the children are
very young is called the "tender years doctrine." See Stewart v. Stewart, 156 Fla. 815,
24 So. 2d 529 (1946). See also Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (saying that the older and more mature the children the more appro-
priate a joint custody arrangement); Chapman v. Chapman, 3 Wis. 2d 559, 89 N.W.2d
207 (1958) (two-year-old daughter should be awarded to good and affectionate
mother).
These cases should not be interpreted to mean that joint custody of young children
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IV. IN CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A BROAD
DEFINITION
Once the court and the parties have evaluated these ben-
efits, risks and factors as applied to their particular case, a
decision can be made as to whether some form of joint cus-
tody or shared parental responsibility should be attempted.
But what form? This again raises the question of what ex-
actly is joint custody today. Black letter statutory definitions
go only so far. Is it daytime with one parent and nighttime
with the other? Joint legal custody with both parents, but
actual physical contact and control essentially with only
one? The truth is that custody arrangements are as varied as
are the situations and personalities of divorced families and
more than one arrangement can fairly be described as a true
joint custody arrangement. No single arrangement will be
suitable for everyone. One situation in California, for exam-
ple, has involved a father who moved to the downstairs
apartment after the divorce.86 The child primarily lives with
her mother but frequently spends the night with her father.
She usually eats breakfast with him and dinner with her
mother. So far it is working, but if the parents remarry,
move or develop serious conflicts with one another over
child rearing, a modification may become necessary.
A working definition of joint custody should be broader
than that specifically described in Wisconsin's section
is prohibited. The tender years rule, like the mother preference rule, has been statuto-
rily abolished in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1983), and at
least diminished by case law and by statute in Wisconsin, Scolman v. Scolman, 66
Wis. 2d 761, 226 N.W.2d 388 (1975); Wis. STAT. § 767.24(2) (1981-1982). See Podell,
Peck & First, supra note 45, at 57 (calling the tender years doctrine "archaic").
Joint custody may be even more important where the child is very young and,
therefore, unable to express or enforce his or her desire to form a close relationship
with the nonresidential parent. It is at this point that the development of a parent-
child relationship is essential and flexibility of schedules and parental cooperation is
most important. The child's later lack of cooperation or fondness for the absent par-
ent is frequently attributable to poor parental cooperation and limited parent-child
contact when the child was an infant.
Pronouncements about the tender years doctrine are usually based on socio-psy-
chological studies rather than explicit law. Their value will depend upon the weight
accorded judges' opinions on socio-psychological matters.
86. Stein, Joint Custody: How Three Families Cope, San Francisco Examiner,
July 20, 1982, at 1 (People Section), col. 1.
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767.24(1)(b),8 7 which is limited to situations in which both
parents agree to joint custody and have equal rights and re-
sponsibilities. I would define it more broadly to include the
kind of arrangement required by the Wisconsin legislative
intent,8 that is, an arrangement that encourages close con-
tact with both parents and joint parental responsibility
whether or not the residential and responsibility division is
equal. As so defined, the decree might be expressed as "sole
custody, but joint responsibility and liberal visitation," but
the reality would be joint custody.89
I believe that the application of the limited kind of joint
custody called for in section 767.24(l)(b) will pose some dif-
ficulty. That kind of joint custody is to be awarded only
when the parties agree to it and when it serves the best inter-
est of the child. If strictly interpreted, there will be few in-
stances when parties will be able to agree to it; if interpreted
liberally, there will be few instances when courts could, in
light of the legislative intent, conclude that the child's best
interest would not be served by awarding joint custody. The
real challenge to Wisconsin judges is to determine which
kinds of cases justify this broader form of "joint custody";
therefore, I believe that this approach-putting form over
substance-is justified.90
87. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(l)(b) (1981-1982).
88. See supra text accompanying note 13.
89. Scott v. Scott, 401 So. 2d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("The [trial court's]
judgment, perhaps to avoid the impact of the rule disfavoring split-custody provisions
... calls for [sic] the four separate months to be spent with the father 'visitation.' We
call it custody, and counsel for the father concedes it is."); Forman v. Forman, 315 So.
2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("The mere fact that the court feels that the grandpar-
ents might play a significant role in assisting to bring about a better domestic environ-
ment for the child does not deprive the father of a 'natural right,' nor should labels
such as 'joint' or 'conditional' custody... govern our determination of this appeal.").
90. In further comment on the Wisconsin approach, one of that state's practition-
ers states:
The major problem with any joint custody statute is that it requires very
careful and precise drafting by the attorney involved. It seems to me that in
order to avoid tremendous postjudgment litigation, there should be specific
orders as to support and placement. It would be unrealistic to expect a statute
to encompass all the variables that could arise. The benefit of the Florida
statute is that it provides some guidance for the drafting attorney and judge as
to what a custody stipulation and order can contain. Although the Wisconsin
statute is not as specific, the actual orders made pursuant to our statute often
look like the Florida statute. The very vagueness of the Wisconsin statute may
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Accordingly, I would define "joint custody" as an ar-
rangement whereby each party retains full and joint parental
responsibilities and rights with respect to their child; where
the residential plan is flexible and designed so that each par-
ent has frequent, continuing and close contact with the child;
and where both parents jointly make major decisions affect-
ing the child to the extent practicable, even though, because
of the practicalities involved, the child may live with one
parent more than the other or one parent may be given au-
thority to make child care decisions when the two parents
are unable to agree. Moreover, physical contact should be
comparable, not necessarily equal, and may even be sub-
stantially unbalanced because of particular circumstances.
At one extreme might be the California arrangement de-
scribed above.91 At the other extreme, where, for example,
one parent lives far from the child, frequent contact may in-
volve heavy use of mail and telephone and "major" deci-
sions may be very few or may require joint consultation with
ultimate authority in the residential parent. More com-
monly, it probably would involve primary residential care
with one parent and the other parent having as much physi-
cal contact as is feasible and consistent with the parties' and
the child's needs, schedules and desires.
A typical physical arrangement might be the school year
with one parent and some of the summer, frequent weekends
and holidays with the other. In other cases, the child might
alternate school semesters and holidays with the parents or
Monday through Thursday with one parent and Friday
permit more innovative orders than the more specific Florida statute. In addi-
tion, I believe that unless specific placement of the child is stated, as well as the
times when the child will be with one parent or another it would be very diffi-
cult to initiate prosecution under Wis. STAT. § 946.71 (1981-1982), interference
with child custody. As a matter of fact, it is my understanding that the Mil-
waukee County District Attorney's office is reluctant to start an action under
that statute, unless the placement is specified in the family court's order.
Letter from Paula K. Lorant to the Marquette Law Review (Mar. 14, 1983). See also
Letter from Paula K. Lorant to the Marquette Law Review (Mar. 17, 1983) (quoting
Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney (now Milwaukee Municipal Court
Judge) Christopher Foley as saying that since Wis. STAT. § 946.71(2) (1981-1982) re-
quires that the child be taken out of state "for the purpose of depriving the parent...
of the custody of the child. . . " it would be very difficult to successfully prosecute
unless the placement of the child was specified in the joint custody order).
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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through Monday with the other. Occasionally judges have
left the child in the family home but provided for the parents
to rotate on a periodic basis.92 The important philosophical
point is that even though the physical care might essentially
be in one home, the important philosophical point is that the
child lives in both homes, rather than lives with one parent
and visits with the other, and that contact and involvement
with both parents is maximized.
Another quality which distinguishes this broad definition
of joint custody from its more traditional forms is its flex-
ibility. A plan may set forth a definite schedule, but unless
the parents are able to cooperate and be flexible, all mem-
bers of the family could find themselves locked into an oner-
ous regime and the laudable purposes of section 767.24(l)(b)
would be defeated. Joint custody also differs from other
forms of custody, specifically split, divided, rotated or alter-
nate responsibility wherein physical care is shifted from one
parent to the other with the parent having physical care also
having sole parental responsibility.
Under this broad definition the parties and the court can
again consider the above-mentioned factors93 which should
influence the specific responsibility agreement or order. This
is an analytical rather than mathematical process and each
case must turn on its own merit. It should not be determined
by adding up a set of cliches.
Although joint custody is currently in vogue, it is by no
means a recent invention.94 Yet court pronouncements
throughout the country have produced an inconsistency of
approach typical of matrimonial decisions generally. 95 Now,
however, the legislatures of both states have spoken. Cus-
tody arrangements which recognize the need for close con-
92. See, e.g., Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
198 1); Sandy v. Sandy, 106 Wis. 2d 230, 316 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1982).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 71-85.
94. Judging from the many appellate decisions in Florida in the 1930's and 1940's
on this issue, Florida judges did not hesitate to enter such orders at that time. See,
e.g., Dobbs v. Kelly, 39 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1949); Stewart v. Stewart, 156 Fla. 815, 24 So.
2d 529 (1945); Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 23 So. 2d 623 (1945).
95. See generally Loeb & McCann, Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of an Ad-
vancedDegree upon Dissolution of a Marriage, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 495 (1983) (describ-
ing confficting court pronouncements from throughout the United States on the issue
of whether a professional degree is a divisible asset of a marital estate).
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tact with both parents and encourage joint parental
responsibility will be the norm and such orders should be
encouraged. Still, it would be a mistake to award joint cus-
tody in every case. Joint custody is the presumption, but
each case must be considered on its own facts. Ultimately,
the factors discussed above96 should be utilized not to deter-
mine whether joint custody should be ordered but rather to
determine the specific details of the arrangement or whether
such an arrangement would be detrimental to the child, thus
requiring sole custody.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 71-85.
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